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ABSTRACT 
Since 1995, the Philippines has had several disputes with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) over territory in the South China Sea (SCS). Between 1995 and 2010, Manila 
adopted policies with the PRC centered on accommodation and improving diplomatic 
relations with Beijing. After the election of President Benigno Aquino in 2010, the 
Philippines became more aggressive in its policies towards the PRC, and it has made 
more efforts to counter Chinese aggression than to accommodate Beijing. The Aquino 
administration has made military modernization, especially in regards to its naval 
capabilities, a top priority. In addition, Manila has also attempted to strengthen its 
security relationship with the United States significantly. What are the reasons for this 
change in policy? Through the analysis of Philippine policy decisions between 1995 and 
2010, and policy decisions after the election of President Aquino, this thesis attempts to 
answer the question: Why has Philippine policy towards Beijing’s aggression changed 
since 2010?  
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 1 
I. TENSION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: WHY THE 
PHILIPPINES IS CHALLENGING CHINA’S IMPROVED 
MILITARY MIGHT 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since 1995, the Philippines has had several high-profile confrontations with 
China over Beijing’s expansion into the South China Sea (SCS) and occupation of 
territories claimed by the Philippines. Following the 1995 incident at Mischief Reef, 
Philippine foreign policy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) generally 
emphasized diplomatic engagement and economic cooperation instead of confrontation 
over territorial disputes.1 While the Philippine government chose to engage China 
diplomatically rather than through confrontation, it also attempted to rejuvenate its 
security ties with the United States. However, despite facing an increased threat from 
China in the SCS, the Philippine government also chose not to allocate funds sufficient to 
maintain a capable military force. 
Since the election of Benigno “NoyNoy” Aquino III as president in 2010, a 
significant change in Philippine policy has occurred in response to renewed Chinese 
aggression in the SCS. Under Aquino, the government has made significant efforts to 
modernize its military, especially its naval capabilities. His government has also made a 
greater effort to strengthen its relationship with the United States to improve the 
country’s security and its ability to protect the territories it claims in the SCS. Where 
previous administrations avoided public statements that could provoke the Chinese, 
Aquino’s government has not shied away from making statements that directly challenge 
Chinese aggression.  
Therefore, a significant difference exists in Philippine policies toward China in 
the periods before and after Aquino came to power. The question this thesis attempts to 
answer the following. Why has Philippine policy towards Beijing’s aggression changed 
since 2010?  
                                                 




In an interview by the National Bureau of Asian Research, Ian Storey, who is an 
expert on Southeast Asia’s relations with the PRC, stated, “today, tensions in the South 
China Sea are higher than they have ever been since the end of the Cold War.”2 The 
tension in the SCS is due to the Chinese expansion into areas and territories claimed by 
other Southeast Asian nations. The tensions in the SCS have increased since 2010, when 
“China stepped up its paramilitary and military activities in adjacent waters, pressing its 
territorial claims with a new sense of vigor and destiny.”3 
With the change in Manila’s policy since 2010 in favor of a more assertive 
approach towards the PRC, increased potential for an outbreak of violence in the SCS is 
possible and Beijing moves in on more claimed territories. In addition, the region is now 
set for the rejuvenated entrance of the United States, as Washington shifts its focus to the 
Asian region. With tensions already high, the American presence injects another player 
into the SCS disputes. With the U.S.-Philippine security relationship as close as it is, any 
conflict that involves the Philippines and the PRC may lead to American involvement 
and will see the United States and Beijing facing off in the region.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
When faced with aggression from the PRC in the post-Cold War period, 
Southeast Asian countries have generally chosen to engage Beijing and avoid actual 
confrontation. This point is made by Amitav Acharya, who writes that Southeast Asian 
countries have managed their relations with Beijing by “eschewing a confrontational 
policy towards China, notwithstanding many contentious territorial and economic issues  
 
 
                                                 
2 Tim Cook, “Rising Tensions in the South China Sea: An Interview with Ian Storey,” The National 
Bureau of Asian Research, June 17, 2011, 
http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=151#.UsMa0bQrY8I.   
3 Heydarian, “U.S. ‘Pivots’ on the Philippines.” 
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in their relationship.”4 Avoiding confrontation with the PRC was also Manila’s choice 
until Aquino’s inauguration as president in 2010, when the Philippines’ approach to 
managing its relations with the PRC changed.  
Thus, why has the Philippine policy towards dealing with PRC aggression 
changed? Three explanations are possible. The first explanation could be that Manila’s 
perception of the threat has changed: President Aquino perceives the PRC threat 
differently than his immediate predecessors, and therefore, he has changed the country’s 
policy toward the rising power. The second is that the size of the threat has changed. 
Beijing has simply become too aggressive in its SCS claims, and the Philippines is now 
forced to counter Beijing’s expansion into its claimed territories. The third explanation is 
that the Philippines can count on increased support from the United States to resist 
Chinese pressure. With Washington focusing more on Asia since 2010, and planning to 
allocate more forces to the region, Manila may feel that it can be more assertive in 
defending itself against Chinese encroachment. If conflict were to occur between China 
and the Philippines, Manila would be able to rely upon American forces for support. 
Currently, a large body of information and analysis available assesses and 
documents disputes between the PRC and the Philippines in the SCS. However, analysis 
assessing why the Philippines has changed its approach to PRC aggression since 2010 is 
lacking. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been and is currently 
dealing with the rapid growth of Chinese power. The overarching response from the 
ASEAN countries up to this point has been to avoid confrontation with the more 
powerful PRC, and instead, adopt a policy of engagement through multilateral 
diplomacy. Southeast Asian countries have also moved to modernize their militaries 
through increased defense budgets and purchases of military equipment from other 
countries. Some in the ASEAN community also look for superpower support from the 
                                                 
4 Amitav Acharya, “Seeking Security in the Dragon’s Shadow: China and Southeast Asia in the 
Emerging Asian Order” (working paper, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, March 
2003), 1. 
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United States to strengthen their security ties and their relationship with Washington. 
Even though Southeast Asian countries have had territorial disputes with Beijing, the 
nations have avoided adopting policies toward the PRC that could be seen as aggressive 
or confrontational.5 The ASEAN countries are wary of the PRC’s growing power and do 
not desire to align themselves strategically with it. Instead, Acharya writes, “they see 
their interests better served by a policy of engagement.”6 
One serious concern for the ASEAN community is PRC expansion into the SCS, 
which it believes is potentially a major “flashpoint of conflict in post-Cold War Southeast 
Asia.”7 The Chinese encroachments into the SCS have an impact on more than one 
member of ASEAN, and, in keeping with their tendency to avoid confrontation with 
Beijing, they have worked as a group to engage the PRC. In 2002, the PRC and ASEAN 
signed a declaration on a code of conduct in the SCS that called for each party to 
“exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate 
disputes and effect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of 
inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and 
to handle their differences in a constructive manner.”8 This agreement illustrates 
ASEAN’s desire to engage Beijing diplomatically in concert rather than confronting it 
with force.  
Also, bilateral agreements between Beijing and Southeast Asian countries 
demonstrate the latter’s preference for diplomacy over confrontation. Vietnam has 
experienced several disputes with the PRC in the SCS. In 1993, Vietnam chose to deal 
diplomatically with Beijing, and both countries agreed to the “non-use of force and to 
refrain from any action which might worsen relations.”9 Sino-Vietnamese-relations were 
strained again in 2005, when nine Vietnamese fishermen were killed by Chinese security 
forces in a disputed area in the Gulf of Tonkin. Then, in May 2011, it was reported that 
                                                 
5 Ibid.,1. 
6 Ibid., 2. 
7 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of 
Regional Order, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 157. 
8 Ibid., 159. 
9 Ibid. 
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Chinese patrol boats had “deliberately cut a seismic cable being towed by a survey ship 
in waters claimed by Vietnam.”10 Again avoiding confrontation, the Vietnamese worked 
with the PRC diplomatically, and one month after the cutting of the seismic cable, the 
countries proclaimed that they agreed to “peacefully resolve their maritime disputes 
through negotiations and friendly consultations.”11 Hanoi also used diplomacy to settle a 
land border dispute with Beijing, and signed the Land Border Treaty in 1999. Vietnam is 
a good example of a Southeast Asian country desiring diplomacy over confrontation. 
Even after nine Vietnamese fishermen were killed, Hanoi still sought to work with 
Beijing through diplomatic means.12  
Aside from the PRC actions in the SCS, ASEAN is also faced with the underlying 
issue of the PRC’s rising military power. One way in which the ASEAN nations have 
responded is by increasing their defense budgets. Indonesia, for example, doubled its 
defense spending between 1998 and 2004. The Malaysian government increased its 
defense spending by over a billion dollars between 2001 and 2003.13 The ASEAN 
nations also started upgrading their military arsenals through purchases from other 
governments. The Indonesian military purchased SU-27 and SU-30 fighter jets, 
submarines, attack helicopters, and land systems. Singapore bought 12 new F-15SG 
fighter jets from the United States, Malaysia purchased a submarine from France, and 
Singapore acquired a submarine from Sweden.14  
In addition to upgrading its military capabilities, Singapore moved to tighten its 
relationship with Washington after the United States removed its forces from the 
                                                 
10 IHS Jane’s, “Vietnam: External Affairs,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—Southeast Asia, last 
modified, July 6, 2012, 
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference&ItemId
=+++1305170&Pubabbrev=SEA.  
11 IHS Jane’s, “China and Vietnam Pledge to Solve South China Sea Dispute Peacefully,” Country 
Risk Daily Report, last modified June 27, 2011, 
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=++
+1120452&Pubabbrev=IWR.  
12 Ramses Amer and Li Jianwei, “How to Manage China-Vietnam Territorial Disputes,” April 18, 
2013, China-US Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/how-to-manage-china-vietnam-
territorial-disputes/.  
13 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, 161–162. 
14 Ibid., 163. 
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Philippines. In 1989, it offered to provide military facilities to the United States, and 
eventually signed a memorandum that allowed American aircraft and military personnel 
in Singapore. The relationship grew even tighter in 1992 when an agreement was reached 
that “relocated a major naval logistics facility responsible for port calls and resupply for 
U.S. navy ships and coordinating warship deployments in the Pacific region from Subic 
Bay to Singapore.”15 Other reasons for ASEAN countries to improve their militaries 
exist, but Acharya points out that the improvements “have also been inspired by the rise 
of Chinese military power.”16 Through these material improvements and superpower 
relationships, the ASEAN community is better able to project power, but its capacity to 
do so is still minimal compared to the PRC. These countries desire diplomacy with 
Beijing over confrontation and their ability to project some power may allow them a 
better chance in diplomatic negotiations.  
1. Philippines: 1995–2010 
Beijing’s interest in the islands of the SCS is not something that has emerged 
recently. While the Chinese claims in the SCS go back more than 100 years ago, their 
disputes with the Philippines came to a head in 1995. Ross Marlay provides a detailed 
account of the 1995 dispute, which began after a Filipino fisherman reported that he had 
been detained for a week by the Chinese. In response, Manila sent a reconnaissance 
aircraft to take photographs of the reef, which revealed “four octagonal structures, 
resembling guard towers, with a satellite dish.”17 The PRC reported that they were wind 
shelters, but that did not stop the Philippine Navy from destroying stone markers that it 
also discovered on Mischief Reef while eight Chinese vessels were in the area.18 
Even though the Philippine Navy destroyed stone markers at Mischief Reef, the 
response from the Philippine government to what Acharya calls “the first encroachment 
by China into an area claimed by an ASEAN member” was to avoid confrontation with 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 221  
16 Ibid., 161, 163. 
17 Ross Marlay, “China, the Philippines, and the Spratly Islands,” Asian Affairs 23, no. 4 (1997): 204. 
18 Ibid. 
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Beijing.19 Following the 1995 incident, President Fidel Ramos’ administration adopted 
policies similar to those of President Aquino in 2010, and leaned on the United States by 
signing a visiting forces agreement in 1998. The Philippines also began conducting joint 
military exercises with the United States, which were “aimed at improving 
interoperability and readiness, and building professional relationships among the two 
military forces.”20 This type of alignment with the United States was similar to that of the 
Singapore agreements in the early 1990s and strengthened Philippine security.  
Under the leadership of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Philippine policy 
toward China became more accommodating and focused more on strengthening 
diplomatic relations. President Arroyo placed improving diplomatic relations with the 
PRC as a top foreign policy priority in the early 2000s. Arroyo set out to tighten Manila’s 
economic relationship with Beijing and to bring about a cordial relationship between the 
two countries.21 An example of Arroyo’s administration trying to improve relations was 
the signing of an agreement called the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) in 
2004. A second JMSU, which included the PRC and Vietnam, was signed in 2005. The 
objective of the joint pact was pre-exploration activity to assess petroleum resource 
potential in the SCS.22 The 1995 incident clearly saw the Philippines being confronted by 
the Chinese, to which the Philippine government responded, as other ASEAN countries 
had before, by working to improve its diplomatic relations with the Beijing.  
One area in which the Philippine response to the Chinese challenge in 1995 
differed from other ASEAN countries was in a lack of military modernization. During the 
Ramos administration, the Philippine government sought to improve the state of its 
military in 1996 by passing a defense modernization bill, but the Asian financial crisis 
prevented the government from actually modernizing. During the Estrada and Arroyo 
presidencies, between 2000 and 2008, the defense budget only rose $70 million, from 
                                                 
19 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, 158. 
20 Ibid., 222. 
21 Ian Storey, “Asia’s Changing Balance of Military Power: Implication for the South China Sea 
Dispute,” National Bureau of Asian Research, accessed May 15, 2013, 
http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=564.  
22 Madel R. Sabater, “Palace: JMSU Worsens Spratlys Dispute,” Manila Bulletin, July 6, 2011. 
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$850 million to $920 million. Regarding this failure to increase military funding, Ian 
Storey writes, “despite assistance from the United States, the Philippines’ ability to 
provide for external defense and uphold its claims in the South China Sea is likely to 
remain weak for the foreseeable future. The government has not devoted sufficient 
resources to the armed forces for it to replace obsolete equipment.”23 While other 
ASEAN countries moved to improve their own militaries, the Philippines failed to do so, 
which left its military dilapidated and ineffective. 
In most respects, the Philippine response to the Chinese confrontation in 1995 
was not out of the ordinary for a Southeast Asian country. Manila strengthened its 
relationship with the United States and attempted to improve its diplomatic relations with 
China. The one area in which it differs is that it chose not to allocate sufficient funds to 
modernize the military.  
2. 2010: A Turning Point  
A fundamental shift in Philippine policy towards the PRC began in 2010, when 
Senator Benigno Aquino was elected president of the Philippines. The election of Aquino 
led the Philippines to adopt a more assertive stance towards the PRC, and he shifted away 
from the policies by the Arroyo administration geared towards accommodating Beijing.  
The contrast in policies between Arroyo and Aquino would be seen in when 
tensions between the Philippines and the PRC flared up again in 2012 over the disputed 
Scarborough Shoal. According to Jane’s, the Philippine Navy attempted to “intercept 
Chinese fishing vessels suspected of illegal fishing, but CMS (Chinese Marine 
Surveillance) vessels intervened,” which led to both sides refusing to depart the area for 
weeks.24 In June 2012, tensions escalated further when Filipino fishermen reported that 
Chinese vessels were delivering building materials near the reef. Recalling the 1995 
incident that involved the building of wind shelters by the Chinese, Manila was 
                                                 
23 Storey, “Asia’s Changing Balance of Military Power: Implication for the South China Sea Dispute,” 
9. 
24 Jon Rosamond, “Surface Tension: Rivals Jostle in South China Sea,” Jane’s Navy International, last 




concerned these materials would be used to construct similar structures near the 
Scarborough Shoal. The tensions escalated further in July, when Philippines Foreign 
Affair Undersecretary Erlinda Basilio accused the Chinese of blocking the entry to the 
lagoon at the center of the Scarborough Shoal with “nets, rope, and dinghies.”25 The 
2012 incidents between the PRC and the Philippines are very similar to those experienced 
in 1995, but the response of the Philippine government since 2010, and to the 2012 
incidents in particular, departed from previous Philippine reactions.  
One explanation for the change in policy towards the PRC may be the way in 
which President Aquino perceives the threat from Beijing in contrast to his predecessors. 
Arroyo may not have perceived the threat as strongly as Aquino and believed that Manila 
could diffuse the tensions through diplomacy, whereas Aquino has seen the PRC 
aggression as a severe threat that cannot be resolved through diplomatic means. One 
example that clearly shows the contrast between President Aquino’s stance on Chinese 
aggression in the SCS and previous administrations is Aquino’s dislike of the JMSU pact. 
Where Arroyo viewed the JMSU as a policy that would improve Sino-Philippine 
relations, Aquino cites the pact as one of the causes for the increased Chinese aggression 
experienced in the SCS. Aquino’s administration believes that Beijing only began to 
claim non-disputed areas after the JMSU. A presidential spokesperson has thus stated, 
“the JMSU provided an opening for the Chinese to claim.”26 The belief that JMSU 
opened the door for the PRC to move in on Philippine claims is not just political rhetoric. 
By entering into the JMSU, Manila provided legitimacy to Chinese claims in the SCS, 
and Barry Wain points out that the Philippines even agreed to joint surveys in parts of its 
legal continental shelf not being claimed by Beijing.27  
The Philippines has also ramped up its rhetoric pertaining to the PRC and the SCS 
since Aquino took office. In his 2011 state of union address, President Aquino, referring 
                                                 
25 Rosamond, “Surface Tension: Rivals Jostle in South China Sea.” 
26 Sabater, “Palace: JMSU Worsens Spratlys Dispute.” 
27 Barry Wain, “Manila’s Bungle in the South China Sea,” Far Eastern Economic Review 171, no. 1 
(2008): 48. 
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to the SCS, said, “what is ours is ours.”28 That declaration encompasses the current 
Philippine position towards Chinese encroachments in the SCS. Most recently, on May 
24, 2013, when a Chinese warship was operating near a reef occupied by Filipino 
marines, the Philippine defense secretary stated, “to the last soldier standing, we will 
fight for what is ours.”29 This type of rhetoric, which asserts a Philippine vow to counter 
Chinese aggression directly, was not characteristic of Manila’s posture under previous 
administrations. 
Another explanation that may explain Manila’s change in policy towards the PRC 
is that the size of the threat has changed and the Philippines must now strengthen its 
military capabilities to deter future PRC aggression. A 2011 special report by the 
National Bureau of Asian Research discusses the PRC’s growing military power. The 
authors of the report write, “China’s defense budget is the highest in Asia and second 
only to the United States globally. The pace and scope of PLA modernization, especially 
with regard to the PLA Navy, are changing the strategic context of the dispute, 
increasingly placing China in a much stronger position to uphold its sovereignty claims 
and, if necessary, pressure the other disputants.”30 President Aquino’s government has 
made military modernization a priority, which, as previously discussed, was not the case 
before he came to office. In March 2011, the Philippines invested $183 million to 
purchase patrol ships, an air defense radar system, and patrol aircraft, which will be used 
around the Spratly Islands to defend its claimed territory.31 Then, on May 22, 2013, the 
Philippines Daily Inquirer reported that President Aquino was allocating $1.8 billion to 
improving the Filipino Navy. The money, according to the report, is intended to “help 
                                                 
28 Ernest Z. Bower and Ian Saccomanno, “Philippine President Benigno Aquino’s State of the Nation 
Address,” July 26, 2011, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
http://csis.org/publication/Philippine-president-benigno-aquinos-state-nation-address. 
29 Mynardo Macaraig, “Philippines Vows to Defend Territory Against China,” The Bangkok Post, 
May 23, 2013. 
30 Clive Schofield et al., From Disputed Waters to Seas of Opportunity: Overcoming Barriers to 
Maritime Cooperation in East and Southeast Asia, (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2011), 22. 
31 Jon Grevatt, “Philippines to Invest USD 183 Million in Defence of Spratly Islands,” Jane’s Defence 
Industry, last modified March 29, 2011, 
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=++
+1150591&Pubabbrev=JDIN.   
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defend the country’s maritime territory against ‘bullies,’ amid an ever-worsening dispute 
with China.”32 Speaking to the naval chiefs, Aquino stated, “we have a clear message to 
the world: The Philippines is for Filipinos, and we have the capability to resist bullies 
entering our backyard.”33 The readiness and capabilities of Philippine military when 
Aquino took office were dismal, but his administration has made it a priority to dedicate 
funds to improve its standing. The Philippines is going to need a drastic improvement in 
its military capabilities because, as M. Taylor Fravel points out, “China now possesses 
greater capabilities to defend its claims and has been more willing to use these 
capabilities, especially since 2009.”34 
A third explanation for the Philippines’ change in policy is that Aquino’s 
government believes it can count on increased support from Washington. Although 
Manila sought U.S. support following the 1995 Mischief Reef incident, Washington 
made it known to the Philippines that it would not come to its aid if conflict over the reef 
occurred.35 President Aquino’s administration has made more of an effort to tighten the 
relationship with the United States, and the more aggressive approach appears to be 
paying off. The Philippine military, especially the navy, is largely outmanned by the 
more capable Chinese military, which has led Aquino to turn to his American ally. Ernie 
Bower and Prashanth Parameswaran write, “the Philippines has realized it is outmatched 
militarily and mounted an ambitious defense modernization program. It has looked to 
Washington for help and is likely to seek further assistance, both in terms of more 
military hardware and facilitating discussions with other U.S. allies.”36 The Philippine 
goal of a strengthened security relationship with the United States may be helped along as 
the United States pivots to Asia. Already, the Philippines has acquired two American 
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Coast Guard cutters, and Manila has secured an increased American military presence by 
agreeing to host U.S. ships and forces on a rotational basis. The Philippines has also 
welcomed the arrival of the nuclear submarine USS North Carolina to Subic Bay. No 
doubt exists that the Philippines is making an obvious effort to strengthen its relationship 
with the United States; a move that will improve Philippine security and allow it to better 
defend its claimed territories under threat from PRC expansion into the SCS.37 
A significant contrast has thus emerged between President Aquino’s response to 
Chinese aggression and those of his predecessors, especially Arroyo. Manila’s rhetoric 
with regard to SCS disputes with Beijing has become tougher, and Aquino has not made 
any high profile attempt to improve Sino-Philippine relations as was done in the past, and 
Aquino has even come out against diplomatic endeavors like the JMSU. The government 
has significantly increased the amount of money it dedicates to military modernization, 
and is attempting continually to strengthen its relationship with the United States. Taken 
individually, these policy changes may seem insignificant, but when analyzed as a whole, 
it may be that the Philippines policy of engaging Beijing when confronted has now 
shifted towards a more aggressive stance towards the PRC. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
To answer the question why has Philippine policy towards Chinese aggression 
changed since 2010, this thesis analyzes in detail Philippine policy toward the PRC from 
1995 to 2010, and then Philippine policy towards Beijing since 2010. The first case study 
documents Sino-Philippine disputes during that 15-year period. It then analyzes the 
Philippine response to those incidents and how the Philippines managed its relations with 
Beijing. It draws on Asian newspapers, online journals, speeches, interviews, and 
comments made by government officials.  
The second case study focuses on the same issues in the period since 2010. In 
drawing contrasts between the two periods, the concluding chapter also evaluates the 
three possible explanations as to why the Philippines changed its policy for responding to 
Chinese aggression. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I describes the research question and hypotheses. It includes a brief 
section that illustrates how Southeast Asian nations have generally responded to Chinese 
aggression. Chapter II contains a case study that focuses on the 1995–2010 period and 
includes analysis of the Sino-Philippine disputes and how the Philippines responded. 
Chapter III offers the second case study focused on the events and trends since 2010. The 
final chapter draws conclusions and trace out the implications of the change in Philippine 
policy in terms of managing relations with Beijing.  
 14 
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II. CASE STUDY: PHILIPPINES 1995–2010 
This chapter analyzes Philippine responses to Chinese encroachments in the SCS 
from 1995 to 2010. The first section of the chapter looks at the incidents, which occurred 
between the PRC and the Philippines in the SCS during this time. It then examines the 
reactions and policy decisions made by the Philippine leadership in response to these 
incidents. Included in that discussion is Manila’s attempt to improve the Sino-Philippine 
relationship through diplomacy and agreements for economic cooperation. It also looks at 
Manila’s failed attempt to increase its defense budget significantly and its decision to try 
to strengthen its defense relationship with the United States. 
This chapter is key to the analysis and arguments made in the conclusion of this 
thesis. To show that the Aquino Administration has significantly changed its policies 
towards the PRC, a detailed understanding of the policies implemented prior to his 
administration is necessary.  
A. DISPUTES IN THE SCS 
Between 1995 and 2010, the Philippines had a couple of significant 
confrontations with the PRC in the SCS. First, in January 1995 a Filipino fisherman 
reported to the Philippine government that he had been detained at Mischief Reef for one 
week by the Chinese. In response to the report, the Philippines sent aircraft to investigate 
the area, which led to the discovery of four octagonal structures and a satellite dish. 
President Ramos’ administration believed the octagonal structures resembled guard 
towers, but after Manila released the photos, the PRC claimed the structures were wind 
shelters that had been built by fishermen. The structures, which Ross Marlay says were 
“certainly intended to be a physical declaration of Chinese sovereignty,” were 
deceptively constructed by the PRC because they were built during the monsoon season 
when the Philippine navy was not patrolling the area.38 During this time, the Philippine 
Navy, in the presence of eight PLAN vessels, destroyed Chinese-built stone markers that 
                                                 
38 Marlay, “China, the Philippines, and the Spratly Islands,” 204. 
 16 
were placed around the reef (see Figure 1). Similar structures were built by the Chinese 
on Subi Reef, which according to the Philippines, were modified to become a three-story 
fort equipped with anti-aircraft guns and helicopter landing platforms (see Figure 2).39  
 
Figure 1.  South China Sea40 
                                                 
39 Marlay, “China, the Philippines, and the Spratly Islands,” 204. 
40 Patrick M. Cronin and Robert D. Kaplan, “U.S. Strategy and the South China Sea,” in, Cooperation 
from Strength: The United States, China, and the South China Sea, ed. Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, 
DC: Center for a New America Security, 2012), 11. 
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Figure 2.  PRC Structures on Subi Reef in the Spratlys41 
The most violent clash between the PRC and the Philippines came in January 
1996, when a 90-minute gun battle occurred between three Chinese naval vessels and 
Philippine naval vessels near Campones Island.42 Then, in April 1997, eight Chinese 
vessels were seen operating in the area around Mischief Reef, and along with the vessels, 
a new structure had been discovered six miles from the Philippine island of Kota. Also in 
April 1997, the Philippine Navy confronted two Chinese State Oceanic Administration 
vessels operating near the Scarborough Shoal. In response to the Philippine 
confrontation, the Chinese vessels, which were carrying amateur radio enthusiasts 
planning on making a broadcast from the reef, informed the Philippine Navy that the 
PRC claimed the Scarborough Shoal as its territory.43 
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42 Joshua P. Rowan, “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute,” 
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In 1998, another Sino-Philippine dispute in the SCS arose once again over PRC 
built structures on Mischief Reef. In October that year, the Philippines released 
photographs of Chinese vessels moving construction materials at the reef. It was 
discovered later through photographs taken of the reef that the PRC had built a large 
building, which was adjacent to the original octagonal structures discovered in 1995, and 
were followed by the discovery of even more Chinese construction on Mischief Reef in 
1998 and 1999.44 
These encroachments by the PRC into the SCS could be seen as a significant 
indication of Beijing’s intentions in the SCS. Mischief Reef, where many of the 
altercations occurred, is well within the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone and more 
than 1,000 miles away from the PRC.45 According to the 2013 Annual OSD Report to 
Congress on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 
China,” senior Chinese officials “have identified protecting China’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity as a ‘core interest’ and all officials repeatedly state China’s opposition 
to and willingness to respond to actions it perceives as challenging this core interest.”46 
The same report goes on to say that the Chinese government “maintains that its maritime 
rights extend to virtually the South China Sea.”47 It has been and is a challenge for the 
Philippine government to respond to the PRC’s claims. The next section addresses the 
Philippine responses to what Ian Storey calls China’s “creeping assertiveness.”48 
B. PHILIPPINE REACTIONS: 1995–2010 
The PRC significantly violated Philippine sovereignty in the SCS in the mid- to 
late 1990s. Even after the Philippines discovered Chinese structures, markers, and naval 
activity on around its maritime claims, the responses and policies adopted by Manila 
during this time were rather weak.  
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1. Manila Looks to the United States for Security Support 
The strongest policy the Philippines adopted in response to Chinese aggression in 
the SCS was the move to strengthen its relationship with the United States during the 
Ramos administration. The United States had played a significant role in supporting the 
Philippines external security until 1991, when the Philippine Senate voted 12–11 against 
a new bases agreement that had been signed by Manila and Washington. After the Senate 
voted down the agreement and ash from the volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo made 
Clark Airbase unusable, the United States turned over the air base and then eventually 
removed its naval forces from Subic Naval Base.49 External security was a significant 
priority for Ramos, and he did not agree with the Senate vote to end the bases agreement. 
With the physical departure of U.S. forces from the Philippines, Ramos “hoped that the 
presence of U.S. forces in other parts of Asia would help ensure regional stability, and 
provide a limited security umbrella for the Philippines.”50  
With the departure of U.S. forces from the Philippines, Manila lost a vital piece of 
its external security. The Philippines was now severely constrained in its ability to 
counter a significant external security threat, a fact that Manila realized following the 
events at Mischief Reef in 1995. As Renato Cruz De Castro writes, “this incident 
(Mischief Reef) stirred the country into sounding the alarm over what it perceived as 
China’s expansionist and hegemonic designs in the South China Sea.”51 The Chinese 
aggression in the SCS led the Philippines to begin negotiations with the United States to 
establish a new Status of Forces of Agreement (SOFA) in 1996. The proposed SOFA 
created a surge in domestic criticism in the Philippines, as critics argued that this 
agreement would lead the way to the United States once again occupying Clark and 
Subic. The domestic pressure, however, was not enough to stop Manila from continuing 
to work with the United States to form a new security relationship.52  
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Despite the domestic concerns, the Philippines entered into a new Visiting Forces 
Agreement (VFA) with the United States on February 11, 1998. In 1999, the Philippine 
Senate ratified the VFA, which became a critical piece in reviving the U.S.-Philippines 
security alliance. Speaking about the signing of the VFA, De Castro states, “ten years 
after the last American marine left Subic naval base, Philippine national leaders had to 
confront the stark reality that preserving the strategic equilibrium in East Asia depended 
on U.S. bilateral security commitment and on maintaining a balance of power based on 
American forward deployment in the region.”53 
Although constitutional challenges still exist, which limit U.S. support, especially 
regarding permanent bases, the VFA signed in 1999 began a rejuvenated security 
partnership between the United States and the Philippines. One of most significance is 
that the VFA allowed the two countries to begin conducting joint military exercises in the 
region. In 2002 alone, the United States and the Philippines participated in 15 joint 
exercises, which included Balikatan-02-01, where 4,385 Philippine and U.S. troops 
conducted counterterror exercises.54 Joint exercises were also aimed at projecting 
maritime power in the region, and specifically, islands involved in the SCS disputes. The 
U.S. Navy and the Philippines conducted amphibious exercises near the Spratly Islands, 
which China along with Manila, claim as their territory. In 2004, the joint air exercises 
were conducted at the previously U.S. occupied Clark Air Base.55  
Also of significance is that the VFA increased military aid that the United States 
contributed to the Philippines. Between 2001 and 2005, U.S. military assistance to the 
Philippines went from $1.9 million U.S. dollars (USD) to $126 million (USD).56 The 
military assistance continued to increase throughout the 1995–2010 period, and in 2009, 
towards the end of the time discussed in this chapter, the Philippines received the largest 
amount of International Military Education and Training funds in East Asia and the 
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Pacific. Also, in 2009, Manila received the 12th highest amount U.S. foreign military 
financing in the world.57 While the VFA set in motion by the Ramos administration was 
focused on external security concerns, the aid the Philippines received under Arroyo 
came during a time when internal security was the main focus. Although Arroyo wanted 
U.S. support, her focus was on internal security and the aid from the United States was 
directed towards counter-terrorism, and not defending Philippine territorial claims against 
China.58 
While monetary assistance is important, it the Philippines has benefited from the 
improved security alliance in other ways. In addition to the economic support for defense 
Manila received from Washington, it also received actual military hardware. Between 
2002 and 2009, the Philippines received 28 UH-1H utility helicopters. It also was the 
recipient of one Cyclone Class patrol craft, and over 30,000 M-16 automatic rifles. 
According to Amitav Acharya, the Philippines also received C-130 Hercules transports.59 
Again, although the Arroyo administration sought U.S. support and the United States 
provided it, the aid was directed towards internal security and not countering Chinese 
aggression in the SCS.  
Following the 1995 Mischief Reef crisis, Manila was desperate for security 
assistance, and it turned to its old friend, the United States. The Philippines was in even 
stronger need of the U.S.’ military support due to its failure to invest adequately in the 
modernization of its own military. The next section discusses this failure. One major 
factor to keep in mind about the U.S. aid the Arroyo administration sought and received 
was that its focus was internal security threats, namely counter-terrorism. The Ramos 
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administration, like the Aquino administration, held external security as a top priority and 
signed the VFA to bolster the Philippines’ external security capabilities after the 
departure of U.S. forces. 
2. Military Modernization and Funding 
To maintain a military force capable of defending a state’s security and preserving 
its sovereignty, the government must allocate sufficient funds to defense. Although the 
Philippines had seen the PRC encroach into its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and claim 
territories during the 1990s, the leadership in the government was unable to fund its 
defense force adequately.  
The most significant attempt to modernize the Philippine military between 1995 
and 2010 came under Ramos in 1995, when in February of that year, the Philippine 
Congress passed Republic Act No. 7898, which allowed for the modernization of 
Philippine armed forces. The law was passed as a 15-year program that enabled the 
military to replace existing weapons systems with more modern military equipment so 
that the Philippines could establish a military with external defense capability. The plan 
earmarked funds that would be used to purchase two squadrons of fighter aircraft and 
surface-to-air missile and gun systems. Also, through 7898, the Philippine Navy would 
be able to purchase three frigates, a half dozen corvettes, 12 offshore patrol vessels and 
missile boats, nine helicopters and six fix-winged aircraft.60  
Although the law passed, 7898 was implemented with numerous bureaucratic and 
legal requirements the military would have to meet to use the funds, as the Philippine 
Congress’ approval was required for any arms modernization program. To complicate the 
issue further, the congress was stuck in a debate for almost two years over whether or not 
the country could afford the modernization program. Even though the Philippine military 
told the congress it could not improve the military’s capabilities, the congress determined 
that the military would have to settle for a significantly less amount of funding.61 
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In 1996, after the military and congress finally reached a compromise, the 
congress passed joint resolution no. 28, which authorized the modernization program. 
Again though, the law was very stringent and required “the defense establishment to 
submit to Congress an annual report of the AFP’s (Armed Forces of the Philippines) 
program implementation, along with ‘estimated expenditures and proposed appropriation 
consistent with national security policy laid down by the Philippine Congress.”62 After 
Mischief Reef, it should have been become clear to the Philippine government that its 
defense forces were severely degraded. So why, then, was the modernization bill forced 
to clear so many hurdles for it to be implemented? De Castro states that “the slow and 
tedious passage of the law and the approval of the modernization plan demonstrate the 
Philippine political elite’s general reluctance to drastically increase the AFP’s budget, 
and their general distrust of the Philippine military when it comes to financial 
transactions.”63  
The long drawn out passage of the bill not only delayed the Philippines’ ability to 
improve its security forces, it may have also eliminated the potential for it to happen at all 
during this period. Due to the effects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Philippine 
peso dropped 40 percent against the U.S. dollar and made purchasing modern military 
equipment too expensive for the Philippines to acquire. As a result, the Philippine 
military was unable to purchase the fighter aircraft and the offshore patrol vessels.64 As 
the 1990s came to a close, the only significant military purchase the Philippines had 
made was to acquire one offshore patrol vessel from the United Kingdom that had 
previously been stationed in Hong Kong. The inability of the Philippine Congress to 
allocate sufficient funds towards military modernization put the country on a path of 
continued military degradation. From 2000 to 2008, the Philippines only increased its 
defense budget $70 million (USD), from $850–920 million (USD). Speaking about the 
capabilities of the Philippine military, Ian Storey states, “defense modernization plans 
have given priority to the army, leaving the navy and air force ill-equipped to deal with 
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contingencies in the Spratlys.”65 Scholars were not the only ones concerned over the 
Philippines’ limited defense capabilities. In 2010, speaking to Admiral Robert Willard, 
Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, AFP Chief General Ricardo David discussed 
how he hoped conflict did not arise in the SCS, because if it did, the Philippine military 
had “nothing to shoot with.”66 
The departure of U.S. forces from the Philippines left the country vulnerable to 
Chinese aggression in the SCS because its military was not able to defend its territories in 
the SCS because it simply did not have the military resources to do so. The slow passage 
and implementation of 7898 prevented the Philippines from upgrading its military in the 
1990s, but it also had a major impact on its military well into the 2000s. 
3. Engaging the PRC and Soft Rhetoric 
During the late 1990s and into the 2000s, the Philippines saw its sovereignty 
threatened by the PRC several times in the SCS. This chapter previously discussed how 
the Philippines sought to strengthen its ties with the United States in response to the SCS 
disputes, and it also discussed how the leadership was unable to fund military 
modernization sufficiently. The last area to be discussed is Manila’s interactions with the 
PRC during the 15-year period, which is the focus of this chapter. During this time, the 
Philippines made several significant foreign policy decisions to engage the PRC. Even 
following the events in the SCS, Manila’s leadership decided that it should engage 
Beijing. In addition to these policy decisions, the rhetoric from Philippine leaders during 
this time period was surprisingly soft, especially for a country whose territory was being 
threatened. 
The initial move to engage the PRC came after the events at Mischief Reef in 
1995, when the Philippines and the PRC signed the “Joint Statement on PRC-RP 
Consultations on the South China Sea and other Areas of Cooperation.” In this joint 
agreement, the two countries agreed that disputes over territory should not hinder the two 
nations in working to improve their relations. The joint statement also mentioned 
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building trust between the PRC and the Philippines, as well as cooperating in the safety 
of navigation and search and rescue operations. This agreement did not do much to quiet 
the tensions in the SCS, as several confrontations, which were discussed earlier in this 
chapter, occurred not long after this joint statement was signed.67 
In addition to the joint statement, the Philippines, along with its ASEAN partners, 
sought to engage the PRC through multilateral talks to establish a declaration for a code 
of conduct in the SCS. Beijing first submitted a draft code of conduct, which did not 
include any discussions about sovereignty, which ASEAN did not adopt. The Philippines 
then submitted its own draft of a code of conduct, which ASEAN believed to be too 
much like a treaty rather than a declaration. Finally, in 2002, a declaration on the code of 
conduct in the SCS was signed by China and ASEAN. According to Acharya, the most 
significant words in the declaration “concern an undertaking by the parties ‘to exercise 
self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and 
affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on 
the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle 
their differences in a constructive manner.”68 One area not covered by the declaration 
was a commitment to cease the erection of new structures in the SCS, a point that 
Acharya says the Philippines desired, but China denied.69 
While the negotiations for the code of conduct were ongoing, the Philippines 
signed another joint statement with the Chinese. In November 2000, the two countries 
signed the “Joint Statement Between China and the Philippines on the Framework of 
Bilateral Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century.” Two significant provisions in the 
statement were that “the two sides commit themselves to the maintenance of peace and 
stability in the South China Sea” and that “the two sides affirm their commitment to 
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respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of each other.”70 Even 
after the signing of this joint statement, the Philippines experienced further confrontations 
with the PRC in the SCS.  
In addition to diplomatic engagements, the Philippine government also set out to 
improve its economic relationship with Beijing. Ian Storey states, “in the early 2000s 
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo set improved relations with China as a foreign policy 
priority.”71 Keeping her word, Arroyo entered the Philippines into the JMSU with the 
PRC in 2004. A second agreement in 2005 introduced Vietnam into the JMSU. The 
JMSU was a policy that put the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, Vietnam Oil 
and Gas Corporation, and the Philippine National Oil Company together for the purpose 
of researching petroleum potential in the SCS. In 2008, due to opposition in the 
legislature, the Philippines did not renew the three-year agreement.72 
The Arroyo administration also went to the Chinese to construct a national 
broadband network that linked units of the government, and gave the contract to the ZTE 
Corporation of China. In addition, the Philippines accepted $1 billion (USD) to fund the 
North Rail line on Luzon. In 2009, the Philippines was the largest beneficiary of 
monetary loans from the PRC in Southeast Asia.73  
During 1995–2010, the Philippines also moved slightly closer to the PRC in terms 
of military cooperation. In 2004, Manila reached an agreement with Beijing and signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation. The agreement opened the 
door for Philippine troops to attend language and military courses in China, and the two  
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countries also began sharing intelligence. In addition, according to Jane’s, the PRC 
invited the Philippines to participate in naval exercises, and the Philippines accepted $6.6 
million (USD) worth of non-lethal equipment.74  
Not only did Manila attempt to move closer to the PRC between 1995 and 2010, 
the Philippine leadership also softened its rhetoric on the PRC. In 2004, President Arroyo 
stated, “we should credit China for sincerely wanting to become a good citizen of the 
world.”75 President Arroyo would again make a statement praising the PRC in 2007, 
when she stated, “we are happy to have China as our big brother in this region.”76 
Words are sometimes uttered by leaders, when in reality, little action takes place. 
For the Philippines, it was both. The two previous statements were not just political 
ploys. President Arroyo went further than to just verbally praise the PRC in 2002, when 
she signed Presidential Proclamation No. 148. This proclamation made June 9 of every 
year Filipino-Chinese Friendship Day. The proclamation stated, “the continuing 
friendship between the people of the Philippines and China will enhance the mutually 
beneficial relations between the two countries and also contribute to the peace and 
harmony in the Asia Pacific Region.”77 When Arroyo signed this proclamation, the 
Philippines had just recently dealt with another skirmish involving the Chinese in the 
SCS. Even still, the President of the Philippines made June 9, Filipino-Chinese 
Friendship Day.  
4. Conclusion 
This chapter’s main purpose has been to provide the background against which 
the subsequent shift in Philippine policy can be compared and measured. In concluding 
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this chapter, however, some critical points must be noted about the policies the 
Philippines pursued prior to 2010. First, Manila’s decision to renew the security 
relationship with the United States can be seen a strong reaction to Chinese aggression in 
the SCS. However, as seen in the following chapter, this decision faced significant 
domestic opposition, which discouraged Philippine leaders from proclaiming the 
country’s strong desire to reignite the old alliance with the United States. The Philippines 
did benefit substantially from signing the VFA with the United States, but Chapter III 
describes a different rhetoric coming from Manila in regards to its desire for a strong 
America alliance. 
Second, the Philippines’ attempt at passing legislation that would allocate 
sufficient funds to military modernization failed. It is understood that some members of 
government may have been skeptical of the military, but after the confrontations with the 
PRC over the Philippines territory, it was obvious that the country could not defend its 
own territorial claims in the SCS.  
Third, even though Manila went through several skirmishes with the PRC over 
territorial disputes, the government chose to adopt non-confrontational policies toward 
the PRC in hopes of improving its relationship. Yet, even after it entered into some 
agreements and economic deals, the Philippines still confronted Chinese encroachment 
onto its territory. This approach changed quickly once Aquino came to power in 2010.  
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III. CASE STUDY: PHILIPPINES 2010 AND BEYOND 
The previous chapter examined the disputes between the PRC and the Philippines 
and the policy responses seen from Manila between 1995 and 2010. This chapter follows 
the same outline as Chapter II. The first section discusses the disputes and skirmishes that 
occurred between Beijing and Manila. The chapter then discusses Manila’s policies 
toward the PRC since 2010. It focuses on the Philippines’ more assertive attempt to 
secure sufficient funding to modernize its military capabilities to counter the Chinese 
threat in the SCS. This chapter also reviews Manila’s attempt to strengthen its security 
relationship with the United States to improve its ability to counter PRC aggression in the 
SCS and to defend its territorial claims. Also included is a brief discussion that details 
provocative rhetoric of Philippine leaders aimed at the PRC. 
A. DISPUTES IN THE SCS 
The previously discussed period witnessed significant clashes between the 
Philippines and the PRC in the SCS. Since 2009, the two countries have continued to 
have confrontations over territory in the SCS. The events in the SCS in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s caused friction between Beijing and Manila, and the most recent events have 
also caused heightened tensions between the two countries. 
In March 2011, tensions escalated when a Philippine-flagged exploration ship was 
harassed by two Chinese patrol vessels while conducting oil exploration for possible 
appraisal wells that could be mined by the Philippines near Reed Bank, which is about 90 
miles east of the Spratly Islands. The Chinese vessels ordered the exploration ship to 
leave the area and threatened to ram the ship as the vessels were moving dangerously 
close to the Philippine vessel. Although the Chinese patrol crafts threatened to ram the 






was unarmed, radioed the Philippine military for assistance. The Philippine Air Force 
launched two reconnaissance planes in response to the call for assistance, but the Chinese 
vessels left the area before the aircraft arrived.78 
In April 2012, another confrontation occurred when the Philippines and the PRC 
began what Jane’s referred to as a “tense standoff” over territory located near the 
Scarborough Shoal.79 The extended standoff began after a Philippine warship attempted 
to arrest Chinese fishermen, but was unable to do so because two Chinese marine 
surveillance ships, which were responsible for law enforcement within Chinese waters, 
interfered. The Philippine warship made the move to arrest the fishermen after they had 
reportedly seen illegal corral and fish on board the fishing vessel. In response to the 
incident, both the Philippines and the PRC sent assets to the area where they were 
deadlocked for several weeks in a standoff. Although the standoff ended without 
violence, it ended with the PRC taking control of Scarborough Shoal by using a floating 
fence, and it further soured Sino-Philippine relations in regards to the SCS and territorial 
disputes.80  
Disputes in the SCS have not necessarily involved physical confrontation. 
Intelligence gathered through aerial photos and firsthand accounts of activity in the SCS 
near disputed territory can also heighten tensions between Beijing and Manila. In 
September 2013 of this year, the Philippines reported that the PRC was preparing to build 
permanent structures on the Scarborough Shoal after photographs revealed concrete 
blocks on the shoal, which Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin called a 
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“prelude to construction.”81 The Philippine leadership has reasons to be concerned, as 
was discussed in the previous chapter; the PRC previously built permanent structures on 
Philippine claimed territory at Mischief Reef. Once the structures are complete, it makes 
it less likely that the Philippines will be able to reclaim the territory, which is why these 
reports only increase the tension between the two countries. 
The Philippines was not the only country to experience PRC aggression near 
disputed territories in the SCS after 2010. In March 2013, in what Jane’s calls an 
“unprecedented show of force by the PLAN at the southernmost range of Beijing’s SCS 
territorial claims,” four PLAN warships operated on Malaysia’s James Shoal, which is off 
Borneo’s northwest coast.82 While in this location, the four ships held a ceremony, which 
included a vow to defend Chinese sovereignty in the SCS.83 Although no physical 
confrontation occurred, this event shows another example of the PRC intruding into 
territories claimed by other states. 
Vietnam is another country that has experienced confrontations with the PRC. In 
May 2011, PetroVietnam, which is a state-owned oil and gas company, reported that 
Chinese patrol crafts had purposely cut the seismic cable on one of its vessels operating 
in waters claimed by Vietnam. Later that same month, three PLAN vessels fired on 
Vietnamese fishing boats, which were also operating in waters claimed by Vietnam.84 
Other events in the SCS involving Southeast Asian nations and the PRC have also 
occurred, and although these examples did not involve the Philippines, they portray a 
pattern of behavior that displays the PRC’s aggressive actions in waters claimed by other 
nations. The Philippines has had its fair share of run ins with the PRC over its claimed  
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territories, but when Manila witnesses other state’s dealing with the same type of 
behavior, it increases the tensions between Manila and Beijing even further when those 
two countries become involved in territorial disputes.  
B. PHILIPPINE REACTIONS: 2010 AND BEYOND 
After the President Aquino took office in 2010, the Philippines began to make 
more concerted efforts to counter Chinese aggression than had been seen from previous 
administrations in Manila. Although the Philippines attempted to increase its military 
spending, that objective did not come close to being completed. The Arroyo 
administration sought to improve the Sino-Philippine relationship by engaging the PRC 
on economic policies that were rather unsuccessful and did not prevent Beijing from 
continuing to encroach on Philippine territory. In response to the events in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, Manila did make a strong effort to strengthen its security relationship 
with the United States and was fairly successful in doing so. 
Beginning in 2010, the Philippines began to take on a more aggressive approach 
in dealing with the PRC. The Aquino administration has been more eager and more vocal 
about continuing to strengthen its security relationship with the United States. The 
administration has also made allocating sufficient funds towards modernizing its military 
a priority and has already made improvements.  
1. Seeking a Stronger U.S.-Philippine Alliance 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Philippines moved to improve its 
relationship with the United States following multiple Chinese encroachments into 
territories over which the Philippines claims sovereignty. Considering that the U.S.-
Philippine security relationship was severely weakened when U.S. forces left the 
Philippines, Manila was able to rekindle the alliance to a certain extent over the next 
decade. The signing of the VFA under Ramos was the most significant achievement in 
regards to Manila’s relationship with the United States, because it opened the door to 
other aspects of the relationship, which included joint exercises and funding. Although 
the administrations between 1995 and 2010 took the first steps in revamping the U.S.-
Philippine security relationship, the alliance was largely focused on internal security 
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threats. In contrast, the Aquino administration has attempted not only to enhance the 
relationship further, but has focused the partnership on external security threats, namely 
the PRC (see Figure 3). 
One of the ways in which the Aquino administration has been more aggressive in 
regards to its relationship with the United States is that senior Philippine officials have 
begun to publicly emphasize why the Philippines needs the U.S. partnership. One 
example can be seen from the remarks by Philippine Defense Minister Voltaire Gazmin, 
who stated, “at this point, we cannot stand alone. We need to form alliances. If we don’t, 
bigger forces will bully us, and that is happening now.”85 This mentality can be seen in 
the other ways that Manila has attempted to grow its relationship with the United States. 
 
Figure 3.  BRP Ramon Alcarez86 
                                                 
85 “Manila Gets Serious about Defense; Japan and the U.S. Can Help Rebuild an Ally’s Capabilities,” 
Wall Street Journal (Online), July 15, 2013, 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1399968550?accountid=12702.   





The Philippines continues to receive military hardware from the United States; 
not a new development, but the kind of military equipment it is receiving is very different 
from what it requested and received in previous years. In 2012, the Philippines took 
possession of the ex-U.S. Coast Guard cutter Hamilton, which it renamed the BRP 
Gregorio Del Pilar. Then, in June 2013, the United States sent a second former Coast 
Guard cutter, the Dallas, to the Philippines. Along with the second cutter, which was 
renamed the Ramon Alcaraz, the Philippines also received a retrofit package that 
included a Mark 38 Mod 2 gun system.87 
In April 2012, Philippine Defense Undersecretary Honorio Escueta publicly stated 
that the Philippines would be asking for communications and electronic systems removed 
from the Coast Guard cutters to “assist its (Philippines) efforts in securing assets and 
territory in the South China Sea.”88 Also, in April 2012, Jane’s reported that the 
Philippines was also seeking to acquire a squadron of F-16 fighter aircraft, more U.S. 
Coast Guard Cutters, multirole helicopters and a C-130 Hercules, which is a transport 
aircraft.89 In addition, Philippine leaders have also looked into the possibility of leasing 
Perry class guided-missile frigates, which can be used to patrol the Philippines maritime 
interests, from the United States.90 The previous chapter described the military 
equipment that the Philippines had received from the United States between 1995 and 
2010, and, although the relationship had to start somewhere, the Aquino administration 
has gone far beyond accepting M-16s and UH-1H helicopters. Requesting F-16s and 
other aircraft along with naval assets, such Perry class frigates, reflects not only the 
urgency that the Philippines feels to boost its external defense capability quickly, but it 
also shows a country that wants more from its relationship with the United States. 
As previously mentioned, the VFA signed in the late 1990s by the Philippines 
opened the door to an increase in bilateral cooperation and joint exercises between the 
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United States and the Philippines. The Philippines and the United States have participated 
in numerous joint military exercises over the past decade, but, similar to the change in 
military aid, the exercises have also evolved over time (see Figure 4). For example, in 
CARAT Philippines 2011, which included four days of at-sea exercises, the location for 
the event was not randomly selected. CARAT Philippines 2011 involved approximately 
800 sailors from the U.S. Navy, two U.S. guided-missile destroyers, a U.S. diving and 
salvage ship, P-3C Orions and SH-60 Seahawks and occurred on the east side of 
Palawan, which is the closest Philippine island to the Spratlys. The location for the 
exercise was not randomly selected, especially when the statement from Manila is 
included that states the, “US was duty-bound to protect the Philippines’ interests in the 
Spratly Islands.”91 Similar to Manila requesting more advanced military equipment, the 
Philippines also wants more out of the United States in regards to their joint exercises. 
During the 2012 Philippine-U.S. Strategic Bilateral Dialogue, which occurred in 
Washington, Philippine officials asked the United States for an increase in joint bilateral 
exercises focused on the West Philippine Sea, which is also the SCS.92  
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Figure 4.  List of U.S.-Philippines Joint Military Exercises93 
During the 2012 meeting, the Philippines also asked the United States to deploy 
military assets in the Philippines on a rotational basis until the Philippine military is 
capable of protecting its interests. Since that meeting, the request seems to have been 
agreed to as evidenced by the following events. In 2013, U.S. Navy ship visits to the 
Philippines is on pace to exceed 100, which is double the amount of visits in 2011. In 
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addition, the Philippines hosted two U.S. nuclear attack submarines in 2012 as the 
Philippines and the PRC were once again involved in a dispute at Scarborough Shoal. 
While the United States appears to have come through on the Philippine request for an 
increased presence of forces in the Philippines, Manila is also making other moves to 
achieve the increased presence. The Philippines is reportedly willing to spend $230 
million on a 70-acre facility at Subic Bay, which is only 124 miles from the Scarborough 
Shoal, to not only host U.S. warships, but U.S. aircraft as well.94 
These examples from the Aquino administration show a Philippines not only 
more open about the necessity of the U.S. partnership, but also more vocal about 
requesting additional aid and support. Between 1995 and 2010, the Philippines seemed 
content to receive any support the United States would provide, but since 2010, the 
Philippines has become much more proactive in seeking further military support from 
Washington, particularly support that will further enhance its naval capabilities.  
2. Military Modernization and Funding 
The Philippines’ failure to allocate sufficient funds its military modernization has 
left it vulnerable in regards to its external security and ability to defend its territorial 
claims in the SCS. According to IHS Jane’s, the Philippine navy’s rapid deployment 
capability is limited, and its overall readiness is poor. In 2011, only half of the 
Philippines’ naval assets were afloat, and not all the assets listed as afloat were 
operational. Jane’s assesses the Philippines navy as “effectively unable to offer any 
credible defence to external threats to national sovereignty.”95 
Naval power comprises a large piece of the Philippines’ ability to protect its 
territorial claims in the SCS, but air capabilities are also important for reconnaissance and 
deterring foreign aircraft from operating inside Philippine airspace. The condition of the 
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Philippine Air Force is similar to that of the Navy’s—poor. The Air Force does not 
possess the ability to deploy air assets rapidly, and it also lacks the ability to confront 
aircraft operating without permission in Philippines’ air space, such as the areas 
surrounding the Spratly Islands and other disputed territories.96  
Previous administrations’ failure to fund the military properly has left the 
Philippines with a dilapidated security force. As with the U.S.-Philippine alliance, 
President Aquino has become more aggressive in attempting to secure sufficient 
resources for military modernization and has already made improvements. President 
Aquino did not waste much time before he began beefing up external security 
capabilities. In September 2010, the Philippines announced it would be conducting major 
renovations and making significant improvements to its military facilities in the Spratly 
Islands. In assessing the motivation of the repairs, Jane’s reported:   
Manila’s plan to enhance its military presence in the Spratly underlies the 
tendency of the littoral states in the region to rely on military activity to 
reinforce territorial claims at a time when disputes over sovereignty in the 
South China Sea are increasing.97  
Then in March 2011, the Philippines military announced it would invest $183 
million to defend the areas around the Spratly Islands, which a military spokesperson said 
was a “national priority.”98 The funds would be used to purchase patrol ships, patrol 
aircraft, and an air defense radar system, all of which would be significant assets in 
defending maritime territory.99 
The previous two examples are individual investments in security, but in July 
2012, the Aquino administration released its plans to modernize the Philippine military 
drastically in a white paper entitled “Transforming the Department of National Defense 
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to Effectively Meet the Defense and Security Challenges of the 21st Century.” The plan 
includes a discussion about the failure of previous Philippine leaders to fund military 
upkeep and modernization sufficiently. According to the white paper, Republic Act 7898, 
which was discussed in the previous chapter, ended in 2011 without achieving the 
objectives of the law. The military required 332 billion pesos, which is just over $76 
billion, to “fully realize the envisioned capabilities for naval, air, ground, and joint 
command and control communications and information systems.”100 Of the 332 billion 
pesos the Aquino administration says were needed, only 33.9 billion pesos were actually 
allocated.101 
The plan includes two capability development goals, one of which is to “enable 
the Philippines to exercise full sovereignty over its territory and provide protection to its 
maritime interest.”102 The plan to modernize the military expectedly has a lot of focus on 
capabilities critical to protecting the Philippines claimed territories. The white paper calls 
for a three-tiered navy fleet, which includes not only improved surface capabilities, but 
also submarine and air warfare to protect the country’s exclusive economic zone. Also 
included is the goal of attaining a strategic air strike force to protect the airspace in 
disputed areas, through the acquisition of multi-role fighter aircraft and unmanned aerial 
vehicles. The plan also calls for a strategic sea and airlift capability, as well as air, land 
and sea missile capability and the capability to use mine warfare, which will “support 
other external/territorial defense operations such as sea denial, air and sea interdiction, 
infantry and mechanized operations.”103 Each of these areas can be used to counter 
Chinese aggression, which is an important aspect of the plan. The Aquino administration, 
understanding that the Philippines’ military is need of drastic improvements, has focused 
the modernization plans on areas of defense that can be used to counter Chinese 
encroachment into its territorial waters. Although the plan does not call for any specific 
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amount of monetary spending to achieve the objectives listed, the white paper does set 
the tone for what the Aquino administration’s priorities are. It not only signals to its own 
military that Manila is going to upgrade its military, but it also sends a message to 
Beijing as well. 
In the same month in which the white paper was released, President Aquino 
further reiterated his commitment to modernizing the military when he announced that 
the Philippines would be spending 75 billion pesos, in addition to the 28 billion pesos his 
administration had already spent, to acquire two refurbished C-130 Hercules, upgrade the 
Coast Watch System, and purchase 81 millimeter mortars. In addition, the Philippine Air 
Force would also receive four utility helicopters and take possession of UH-1H 
helicopters that had been upgraded for use in nighttime missions.104 
Aquino again promised more military funding in May 2013, when he announced 
that he would be allocating another 75 billion pesos to “defend the country’s maritime 
territory against ‘bullies.’”105 Aquino also promised that by 2017, the Philippines would 
acquire two frigates, two anti-submarine helicopters, coastal patrol vessels and eight 
amphibious assault vehicles. During the announcement, in addition to using the word 
“bullies,” which was obviously directed at the PRC, Aquino, proclaimed that “we have a 
clear message to the world: The Philippines is for Filipinos, and have the capability to 
resist bullies entering our backyard.”106 
Although the Philippines has a history of not following through on funding the 
military, President Aquino is changing that pattern by not only allocating the funds, but 
also by his comments and public announcements of increased defense spending. The 
Philippines has already made improvements in its military capabilities, and although 
much more still needs to be revamped, the Aquino administration is dead set on making it 
happen. 
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Looking at the actions and policy decisions made by Philippines’ President 
Aquino after taking office in 2010, it is clear that a fundamental shift has occurred in the 
way Manila has dealt with the PRC. During each period examined in this thesis, the 
Philippines faced incidents of Chinese encroachment in the SCS. However, the policies 
that the Philippines adopted in response to these challenges were very different. The 
Aquino administration has made more of an effort not only to strengthen its relationship 
with the United States, but also to be more vocal about its desire to receive additional 
military assistance from Washington. President Aquino’s administration has also made a 
much more aggressive attempt to increase its own spending on military modernization. 
What Aquino has not done is just as significant as what he has done. The administrations 
that preceded him, especially the Arroyo administration, took a softer stance towards the 
PRC, made decisions and implemented policies in an effort to accommodate Beijing and 
improve relations. 
With this shift in the approach towards the PRC since 2010, the logical question 
to ask is, why? As described in Chapter I, three explanations for this shift are likely. First, 
Manila’s perception of the Chinese threat has changed. Second, the threat has grown too 
large for the Philippines to ignore and has forced a change in its policy. Lastly, the 
Philippines is able to count on superpower support for its more assertive efforts to 
counter the PRC in the SCS. 
A. CHANGE IN PERCEPTION 
It is quite possible that one reason for the change in Philippine policy since 2010 
is that President Aquino has different perceptions of the threats facing the Philippines. In 
the early 2000s, the Philippines focused most of its defense resources on internal security. 
President Arroyo’s government was highly concerned by secessionist movements and the 
radical Abu Sayyaf Group. In June 2001, President Arroyo signed Executive Order No. 
21-S-2001, which created the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security, the 
body that created the National Internal Security Plan or NISP. The NISP was a plan that 
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“commit[ted] the entire government machinery to eliminating the root causes of the 
insurgencies and neutralizing the insurgents.”107 The NISP forced the military to shift 
focus from external threats and focus almost specifically on internal defense.  
The security priorities of the Philippines became even more focused on internal 
security following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon in the United States. Following those attacks, the Philippines became a 
key strategic partner of the United States in the war on terror, and the Philippine military 
then began bilateral exercises focused on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, both 
internal security issues. No better example shows how focused the Philippines was on 
internal security than the 2001 National Military Strategy, which detailed an 18-year 
Capability Upgrade Program (CUP). The program was split into three phases, and the 
first phases, counting 12 years of the 18-year program, were dedicated to addressing 
internal security threats.108  
Speaking to the major focus on internal security, Renato Cruz De Castro writes, 
“these capability upgrade projects were formulated on the assumption that the Philippines 
would not face any external security challenge until 2018. Acquisition of a weapon 
system for territorial defense was never considered, and consequently, any efforts to 
purchase military hardware and to conduct training necessary for external defense 
remained essentially on paper and in theory.”109 As was discussed in the previous 
chapter, the Philippines experienced several confrontations with the PRC over disputed 
territory in the SCS in the mid- and late 1990s. So why did the program assume that the 
Philippines would not face an external security threat until 2018, when it just had recently 
just dealt with an external security from the PRC? The answer is that the Arroyo 
administration perceived the internal security challenges as more of a threat than the 
PRC. 
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While the Arroyo administration was focused on internal security threats, it is 
clear that President Aquino’s defense priorities have focused on external threats, namely 
the PRC as evidenced through the Philippines’ attempts to obtain more military 
equipment from the United States, which can be used to protect its territorial claims and 
counter Chinese encroachment. It is also clear that Aquino perceives the threat from the 
PRC differently because of his eagerness to increase defense spending to improve the 
external security capabilities of the Philippine military. Since 2010, the Philippines has 
made military modernization and improving external security capabilities a priority.  
Where previous administrations have failed, the Aquino administration appears to 
be succeeding. A large reason why is that the current administration has set a tone that 
puts military modernization as a priority. A good example can be seen through 2012 
white paper, which not only outlines the administration’s goals for military 
modernization, but also provides reasons for why they are necessary. With increased 
defense spending as a priority, the Aquino administration has been able to renovate some 
military facilities in the Spratly Islands, acquire refurbished C-130s, make upgrades to its 
coastal watch system, and upgrade aircraft so that they can complete nighttime missions. 
President Aquino has also been more aggressive in pledging that more funds will be 
coming to the military and the country will continue to increase its external security 
capabilities. Although Manila attempted to secure increased defense funds through RA 
7898 in the late 1990s, the leadership was unable to do so. While other factors were at 
play, such as the financial crisis, which affected Manila’s ability to allocate the funds, the 
bottom line is that the leadership failed to increase defense spending. Even considering 
the other factors, the Philippines should have made more of an effort to spend more on 
military modernization, especially in light of the events at Mischief Reef and 
Scarborough Shoal, which highlighted Manila’s military weaknesses. 
Where Arroyo chose to allocate resources towards internal security, Aquino has 
chosen to focus on spending money that will improve the Philippine military’s external 
capabilities. During the Arroyo administration, the Philippines focused on exercises that 
dealt with internal security, and, as previously mentioned, the Aquino administration is 
requesting that the United States participate in more bilateral exercises that focus on the 
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Philippines’ external security in the SCS. The internal security challenges that faced the 
Philippines between 1995 and 2010 remain today, but the Philippines has now shifted its 
focus from internal security threats to the external security threat from the PRC, and 
evidence exists to support that a change in perception is the reason. 
A change in perception can also be seen by looking at the Philippines’ policy 
towards the PRC between 1995 and 2010, when Manila was much more focused on 
maintaining a peaceful relationship with the PRC and entering into economic agreements 
with Beijing. The Aquino administration has chosen to improve its external security 
capabilities to counter the PRC rather than accommodate Beijing through economic 
partnerships and diplomacy as the Arroyo administration did. A change in perception 
could easily be argued as the sole cause for the change in Philippine policy, but the 
change in the size of the threat also plays a significant role in changing the perception. 
B. THE SIZE OF THE THREAT HAS BECOME TOO BIG 
Another potential explanation for the change in Philippine policy is that the size 
of the PRC threat has become too large to ignore, and Manila is now forced to change its 
approach in handling the threat from Beijing. The size of the threat has increased, not 
only in terms of the aggressiveness from the PRC, but also in the size of China’s 
economy and its military capabilities.  
While the overall manpower of the PRC is much larger than the Philippines, the 
PRC’s economic success has allowed it to devote a large amount of funding to defense. 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the Philippines has made some progress in 
earmarking more money to defense, but even still, it will never catch up with the PRC in 
terms of military spending. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that the PRC spent 
between $135 billion and $215 billion in 2012 alone.110  
The PRC’s defense spending has allowed Beijing to create a large and capable 
military, and although the PRC’s military might is still improving, the Philippines is 
nowhere near having the capability to counter the PLA’s military strength. With 255,000 
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people, the PLA Navy’s maritime superiority begins with the surface ships, where it 
possesses 19 guided-missile destroyers, 52 guided-missile frigates, and over 150 landing 
crafts.111 The PLA Navy also has 84 fighter aircraft in its arsenal, along with four 
maritime patrol aircraft, and 13 reconnaissance aircrafts.112 In addition, the PRC 
commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in 2012, and the U.S. Department of 
Defense predicts that the Chinese will be adding more carriers to its naval force, and that 
by the middle of this decade, the PRC will launch its first Chinese built aircraft carrier.113 
Overall, the PRC has improved its ability to project force further into the SCS, which is a 
significant threat to the Philippines external security, specifically its ability to defend its 
territorial claims.  
The size and capabilities are not the only reasons that have led to the change in 
policy. Along with the capable military, the PRC has also shown that it is not afraid to 
challenge the Philippines, as well as other Southeast Asian nations’ territorial claims in 
the SCS. Therefore, not only does the PRC possess a far superior military than the 
Philippines and the resources to make continued improvements, it has also demonstrated 
a willingness to use its military to enforce its claims in the SCS. These two things 
combined have caused Manila to come to the realization that it must do everything in its 
power to create a military that is at least capable of deterring PRC aggression. In the 
same way that the change in perception influenced the Aquino administration’s focus on 
military modernization and external security, the size of the PRC threat has also shone a 
light on the need for the Philippines to acquire a more formidable military force, 
especially air and maritime assets that can patrol and defend the Philippines’ territory in 
the SCS. 
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Considering that following the confrontations in the late 1990s, the Philippines 
still chose to focus on internal security, one explanation for the shift in policy since 2010 
may be that the size of the threat has become much larger and more apparent. When the 
Philippines analyzes the PRC’s actions in the SCS, it sees a rapidly growing power 
encroaching not only into its own sovereign territory like the Scarborough Shoal, but into 
those of other Asian states as well. The aggressive actions of the PRC in the SCS are by 
themselves enough to alarm Philippine leaders, but when the PRC’s military power, 
along with their large amount of economic resources is considered, the threat becomes 
even more significant and alarming.  
C. COUNTING ON SUPERPOWER SUPPORT? 
The final possibility that could explain the change in Philippine policy after 2010 
is that the Philippines is expecting superpower support if violent confrontation does break 
out with the PRC. Manila has become much more vocal about its military modernization 
plans and the reasons for them, almost as if it is signaling to the PRC through rhetoric 
that Manila is going to do all that it can to counter Chinese aggressions and will not back 
down. This sentiment can be seen in President Aquino’s remarks referring to “bullies” 
operating in Philippine territory.114 It can also be seen from other statements like those of 
Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, who stated in May 2013 that, “to the last soldier 
standing, we will fight for what is ours.”115 With a similar sentiment, a Foreign 
Department spokesperson stated, “they (PRC) should not be there (Mischief Reef). They 
do not have the right to be there. No one should doubt the resolve of the Filipino people 
to defend what is ours in that area.”116 
One reason Aquino may feel that he can count on U.S. support is because the 
United States has provided an unprecedented amount of assistance to strengthen the 
Philippine navy. Material support from the United States like the acquisition of the two 
U.S. Coast Guard cutters and the Mark 38 Mod 2 gun system are only a part of the 
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support the Philippines has received. The United States has also participated in joint 
exercises with the Philippines in areas around disputed territories. In addition, the 
Philippines has been eager for an increase in U.S. forces inside the country, and the 
United States has increased its port visits and sent nuclear submarines to port inside the 
Philippines.  
The Philippines is unquestionably weaker than the PRC, but the way in which 
Philippine officials have confidently announced military modernization plans, stood their 
ground in confrontations with the PRC, and made the assertive statements aimed at the 
PRC, show a government that appears not to be intimidated. One explanation may be that 
the Philippines is relying upon superpower support if a conflict does break out. In 
addition to the support the Philippines is currently receiving from the United States, the 
1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, which commits the United States to supporting the 
Philippines against an “armed attack,” may also be adding to Aquino’s belief that Manila 
can rely on U.S. support if a dispute with the PRC escalates into a conflict.117  
Recent shifts in U.S. policy toward Asia are another reason that Aquino, unlike 
his predecessors, may be more confident about U.S. support for his policy toward China. 
In particular, the United States pivot to Asia has coincided with his presidency. The 
United States pivot is planned to send 60 percent of its surface ships to the region and 
increase the American presence there. In addition, the United States will have new troop 
deployments to Australia and new naval deployments to Singapore.118 The Philippines 
has reason to be optimistic about the U.S. Asian plan, considering that one of the reasons 
for it is in response to “China’s growing military capabilities and its increasing 
assertiveness of claims to disputed maritime territory, with implications for freedom of 
navigation and the United States’ ability to project power in the region.”119 The pivot 
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will bring more of an American presence to the region, which will benefit the Philippines. 
Having U.S. warships operating near disputed territories could also make it less likely for 
the PRC to encroach into claimed territories, especially the territories of its allies, 
including the Philippines.  
In 1995, even with the 1951 defense treaty in place, the United States was not 
willing to come to the aid of the Philippines in a conflict over disputed territories with the 
PRC. With the increase in U.S. military support and the China focus of the pivot, the 
Aquino administration may believe that the circumstances are different from those in 
1995, and the United States would now be there to support Manila in a conflict over 
disputed territories, which may explain Aquino’s more aggressive approach to China.  
To argue that the Philippines has changed its approach to the PRC because Manila 
is counting on superpower support is difficult to prove, but statements by Philippine 
leaders that the United States is “duty-bound to protect the Philippines’ interests in the 
Spratly Islands,” it is evident that the Philippines expects support.120 The United States is 
not the only power Manila has looked to for support in the defense of its maritime 
interests. On July 27 2013, the Philippines and Japan agreed to a strategic partnership “to 
promote defence and maritime resources protection between the countries’ security forces 
and coast guards.”121 In the agreement, the Japanese committed to sending 10 coast 
guard patrol craft to the Philippines, and the Philippines invited the Japanese to 
participate in joint exercises. After the agreement, Jane’s reported that both Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Aquino voiced concerns about the PRC’s 
aggressive actions inside territories claimed by the Philippines and Japan.122  
Although this explanation is the most difficult to prove, statements and decisions 
have been made that show that the Philippines is expecting superpower support, 
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especially from the United States. Overall, the Philippines has become more eager and 
proactive in its quest for U.S. support than was seen during the 1995–2010 period. 
Although the security relationship during that period was still coming together, Manila 
was still not nearly as receptive to assistance and support from Washington because 
internal security was the major focus. Manila has also solidified an agreement with the 
Japanese, which has gained the Philippines even more support from a regional power.  
D. THE OUTLOOK 
The Philippines has in the past shown restraint when it comes to PRC 
encroachment into territory it claims, which is obvious for a couple reasons, but the most 
significant factor is that the Philippines understands that it is a significantly inferior 
power. Manila has shown, however, that it will not just back down in a confrontation 
with the PRC and will make significant efforts to counter aggression without escalating a 
situation into a violent conflict.  
Manila understands that it would be unable to win a military conflict if it should 
arise over territorial disputes. With the PRC possessing a much larger and capable 
military force, but still holding protecting its sovereign territory as a national priority, 
Manila has taken the fight into the courtroom, where it could possibly achieve a 
diplomatic victory over the PRC. In January 2013, the Philippines initiated an 
international arbitration process under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) in response to the PRC’s actions in the SCS, a process in which the PRC 
refuses to participate. In bringing about the arbitration, the Philippines made four claims. 
The first is that the PRC’s nine-dash line is invalid. The second claim is that the PRC has 
occupied rocks unable to sustain human life, and are therefore, unable to be occupied 
under UNCLOS. The Philippines also claimed that the PRC built structures and occupied 
submerged features that were not islands, but were part of the Philippine continental 
shelf, which is illegal under UNCLOS. The fourth claim was that Chinese harassment 
was illegal.123  
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Although the Philippines withdrew from the Scarborough Shoal, it has not backed 
down against PRC encroachment and is making urgent strides to boost its external 
security capabilities, the Philippines is not looking for a conflict with the PRC. The 
initiation of arbitration against the PRC is an effort by Manila to solve its territorial 
disputes with the PRC with the one weapon it does have—diplomacy. Whether or not the 
Philippines is successful in arbitration remains to be seen, but just choosing to take the 
action shows the Philippines’ desires to secure its territory using diplomacy, not violence.  
The Philippines obviously will not seek out a military conflict with the PRC, but 
Beijing is also not looking for conflict because it would potentially hinder its economic 
advancement and put its international reputation at risk. No question exists that the PRC 
has been attempting to secure territory in the SCS, which it asserts is the sovereign 
territory of the PRC, even if other nations like the Philippines claim the territory as well.  
Even though protecting its territory is a top priority, the PRC is unlikely to take 
any action that would escalate a confrontation into full out conflict. This point is made by 
Ian Storey, who writes;  
China is not likely to try to resolve disputes in the South China Sea 
through military force, as the costs of doing so would greatly outweigh the 
benefits. Instead, Chinese officials are more likely to continue the policy 
they have followed for more than two decades: emphasizing their 
commitment to peace, stability and cooperation while simultaneously 
asserting their jurisdictional claims and expanding China’s physical 
presence in the South China Sea.124  
The PRC and the Philippines do not share many of the same views when it comes 
to the SCS, but the one they do share is that neither of the countries wants an escalation 
into a violent conflict. For the Philippines, a war with the PRC would likely end in 
disaster because its military is just not capable of going toe to toe with the PRC. For the 
PRC, a war in the SCS could risk its economic rise and damage its international 
reputation, neither of which is beneficial to Beijing’s future.  
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In conclusion, it is evident that the Philippines has changed its policies towards 
the PRC since 2010, when President Aquino came to office. Between 1995 and 2010, the 
Philippines did not perceive the PRC as a significant threat to external security. The 
Estrada and Arroyo administrations perceived internal security challenges as the major 
threat to Philippine security. In contrast, the Aquino administration perceives the PRC 
threat to be much higher than previous administrations. The size of the threat is also 
much larger today than it was during the 1990s through mid-2000s. Lastly, the U.S.-
Philippine alliance is currently strong, which is in contrast to the weak alliance that was 
present in the 1990s and 2000s.  
The Aquino administration has been more aggressive in seeking U.S. support and 
has made military modernization and improving his country’s external security 
capabilities a priority, which is in contrast to the Arroyo administration that focused on 
internal security. In addition, the Aquino administration has shown it is not afraid to 
challenge the larger and more powerful PRC. While the actions of the Aquino 
administration are in contrast to those occurring between 1995–2010, significant 
importance can be linked to issues that this administration has not undertaken. President 
Aquino’s administration has not attempted to accommodate the PRC through economic 
agreements and diplomacy as was seen during the Arroyo administration. At the root of 
the change in Philippine policy is a combination of a change in how Aquino perceives the 
PRC threat, the increase sized and improved capabilities of the PRC, and the Aquino 
administration’s reliance on superpower support if conflict with the PRC were to occur.  
Since 2010, the Philippines has focused on countering the PRC threat rather than 
attempting to accommodate it. It is rational to expect that the Philippines will continue 
this more aggressive approach to the PRC throughout President Aquino’s term, but what 
will be the outcome if Aquino is not in office? It is possible that the Philippines’ 
approach to the PRC could change with the election of a new president upon considering 
the significant differences in policies analyzed in this thesis. After all, the Ramos 




example, Ramos focused largely on external security and sought U.S. support to address 
external security concerns. If Aquino does not stay in power, it is possible that the 
Philippines could change its policies towards the PRC again. 
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